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Abstract
A buyer can learn her value for a returnable experience good by trying it out, with
the option of returning the good for whatever refund the seller o⁄ers. Sellers tend
to o⁄er a ￿no questions asked￿refund for such returns, a money back guarantee.
The refund is often too generous, generating ine¢ ciently high levels of returns. We
present two versions of a model of a returnable goods market. In the Information
Acquisition Model, consumers are ex ante identical and uninformed of their private
values for the good. The ￿rm then o⁄ers a generous refund in order to induce
the consumers to learn their values by purchasing and trying the good out, rather
than by doing costly research prior to purchasing. In the Screening Model, some
consumers have negligible costs of becoming informed about their values prior to
purchasing, and always do so; other consumers have prohibitive costs of acquiring
pre-purchase information and always stay uninformed. The ￿rm￿ s optimal screening
menu may then contain only a single contract, one that speci￿es a generous refund,
and hence a high purchase price, in order to weaken the incentive constraint of the
informed consumers.
Keywords: information acquisition, refunds, money back guarantees, returnable
experience goods
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Many products are returned to the seller soon after their purchase. This is especially
true in the United States, where about six percent of all purchased products are returned
for an annual total of more than one trillion dollars.1 Return levels are especially high
in internet and catalog retailing.2
The refunds generating these returns are generous. Full ￿money back￿refunds of the
original purchase price, sometimes lowered by a small ￿restocking fee￿that is charged
the consumer, are typical. Sellers lose money on returns; the refund they pay for a
return almost always exceeds their salvage value for it.3 Retailers have been estimated
to lose up to twenty-￿ve percent of their sales on returns.4 The presence of such generous
refunds suggests that return levels are ine¢ ciently high. Why do ￿rms o⁄er refunds for
returned goods that exceed their own salvage values for them?
This excess refund puzzle has little to do with the refunds speci￿ed by warranties
against product failure. Many returned products are not defective, are not claimed to
be defective, and can not be easily veri￿ed to be defective in any case. Instead, many
are returned by consumers who learn soon after purchasing that they do not value the
product more than the refund given for a return.5 Clothing is returned because it is
found not to ￿t or ￿ atter; nuts and bolts are returned because they are found to be
wrong for the job at hand; a silver-colored DVD player is returned because a spouse
￿nds it ugly. This observation suggests that the excess refund puzzle should be examined
within a model in which consumers learn about a product by purchasing it.
A basic learning-by-purchasing model consists of ￿rms selling a good to consumers
1Rogers and Tibben-Lembke (1999), p. 7-9.
2A NFO Interactive survey shows that in 2000, twenty percent of internet shoppers who purchased a
product online in the ￿rst six months of the year returned it within six months. According to Forrester
Research, the value of internet returns after the 2000 Christmas season was nearly 600 million dollars.
According to Hammond and Kohler (2002), 12-35% of clothing purchased from catalogs is returned.
3The seller￿ s salvage value for a return that is to be discarded is zero (e.g., restaurant food). If a
return is to be resold, the salvage value is still low because it is equal to the (often marked down) resale
price less the cost of refurbishing, repackaging, restocking, and storing the good for resale.
4￿Returns Don￿ t Need to Cost So Much,￿Internet Retailer, www.internetretailer.com, May 23, 2002.
5According to e-BuyersGuide.com￿ s 1999 ￿Return to Sender￿Shoppers￿Expressions survey, 17 per-
cent of those who returned a product purchased online said it (apparel) did not ￿t, 15 percent said they
simply did not want the product, and 16 percent said the wrong product was delivered. Another 27
percent said the returned products were of poor quality or damaged.
1who can learn their personal values for it only by obtaining and using it on a trial basis.
However, if all parties are risk neutral, this basic model does not generate excessive
refunds. E¢ ciency then requires the refund to equal the seller￿ s salvage value for a
return; only in this case will the consumer return the good precisely when she learns
her value is less than the seller￿ s salvage value, as allocative e¢ ciency prescribes. Thus,
since competitive equilibria are e¢ cient,6 competitive refunds are not excessive. Neither
are monopoly refunds: as we shall show, a monopoly seller in this basic model extracts
rent by charging a high price rather than promising a distortionary refund.
On the other hand, excessive refunds do arise in the basic model if the consumers are
made risk averse. Because a consumer￿ s value for the good is unveri￿able, a second-best
e¢ cient outcome consists of ￿rms o⁄ering excessive refunds that partially insure con-
sumers against the risk of realizing a low value.7 In our view, however, the applicability
of an explanation based on risk aversion is limited. It is implausible that consumers are
signi￿cantly risk averse with respect to many products for which returns are prevalent,
such as clothing, books, and even home electronics, that cost little relative to personal
wealth. What is needed, then, is an explanation that does not depend on risk aversion.
Given that the learning-by-purchasing model is inconsistent with the observation of
excessive refunds when consumers are risk neutral, what is wrong with it? We suggest
that it is the assumption that a consumer can learn her value for the good only by
trying it out. Consumers in reality often have other ways of acquiring this information.
Before they decide to purchase a good, consumers often do research to learn about its
features, and which are important to them. They read product reviews, consult experts
and friends, study their needs, and so forth. Given this second channel for information
acquisition, a consumer chooses between learning her value by conducting prior research,
or by purchasing the good to try it out. The smaller the refund o⁄ered for a return, the
more attractive the consumer ￿nds the prior research option.
We are thus led to a learning-by-researching-or-purchasing model. Its central premise
is that consumers can privately learn their values in one of two ways, by conducting prior
research or by purchasing the good and trying it out. We refer to the consumers who
learn their values prior to purchasing as informed, and to the remainder as uninformed.
The prior research option may be costly for a consumer, and possibly only some may
6This is easily proved, and is the special case ￿ = 0 of our Proposition 1.
7Although we have found no reference for it, this result is not hard to show. Che (1996) studies the
basic learning-by-purchasing model with risk averse consumers, but restricts attention to the monopoly
case and requires refunds to equal the purchase price, as we discuss below.
2choose it. A ￿rm may or may not want to encourage the prior information acquisition.
It may also want to o⁄er a menu of contracts from which the informed and uninformed
will make di⁄erent choices.
In order to disentangle the information acquisition and screening e⁄ects, we restrict
attention to two polar versions of the model. In Model IA (Information Acquisition), all
consumers have the same, intermediate cost of becoming informed. They all thus make
the same information acquisition decision. This removes the screening role of a refund,
allowing us to focus on the use of refunds for dissuading consumers from acquiring prior
information.
We take the opposite tack in Model SC (Screening). In this version of the model,
some consumers have a negligible or even negative cost of acquiring prior information,
and so always become informed. The remaining consumers ￿nd it impossible to become
informed prior to purchasing. This removes the information acquisition decision from
the model, allowing us to focus on the role of refunds for screening the uninformed from
the informed consumer types.
The addition of the prior research option does not change some of the results of
the basic learning-by-purchasing model. In particular, in both versions of the model
we ￿nd that e¢ ciency still requires refunds to equal the seller￿ s salvage value for a
return. Since we also ￿nd that competitive equilibria are still e¢ cient, competitive
refunds are still not excessive.8 Excessive refunds do arise, however, if the good is sold
by a monopoly. It may be a monopoly retailer or, under an alternative interpretation,
a monopoly wholesaler or manufacturer selling to a competitive retail sector.
We can now give a preview of the main results for a monopoly seller, in each version
of the model.
Model IA
The seller in Model IA may or may not want to choose a refund contract that induces
the consumers to stay uninformed, depending on which of two opposing forces prevails.
The seller bene￿ts when they stay uninformed because they then receive no information
rents, and the cost of acquiring prior information is not incurred. On the other hand,
when the consumers become informed, the seller bene￿ts by not incurring the net cost
8Thus, we do not ￿nd that excessive refunds are due to competitive pressure, contrary to views
expressed in the retailing literature. E.g., Bayles (2000) writes, ￿Reverse Logistics as a Competitive
Weapon: Returns started spinning out of control back in the late 1980s, when many retailers began
using returns as a competitive weapon in the battle to win market share.￿
3of producing those units of the good that would have been returned if the consumers
had remained uninformed. The former force is stronger if the consumers￿cost of prior
information acquisition lies in an intermediate range. The ￿rm then o⁄ers an excessive
refund in order to deter them from becoming informed. A full refund of the purchase
price is optimal in some cases.
Model SC
The seller in this version of the model o⁄ers, in principle, a menu containing a refund
and a no-refund contract. The informed consumers choose the no-refund contract, and
the uninformed choose the refund contract. In order to deter the informed consumers
from choosing the refund contract, it must specify a purchase price greater than that
of the no-refund contract. When this incentive constraint binds, both contracts specify
the same purchase price, which is equivalent to the seller o⁄ering the same contract
to all consumers. (The informed just ignore its refund provision.) In order for the
refund contract to specify a purchase price as high as that of the no-refund contract
without deterring the uninformed from purchasing, the refund must sometimes exceed
the seller￿ s salvage value for a return. Excessive refunds thus arise when the incentive
constraint of the informed and the participation constraint of the uninformed both bind.
Again, even a full refund of the purchase price is optimal in some cases.
1.1. Related Literature
Davis et al.(1995) and Che (1996) present early learning-by-purchasing models. Davis
et al.(1995) assume consumers are risk neutral, and show that a monopoly prefers to
o⁄er a full money-back refund, rather than no refund at all, if it has a high salvage
value for a return. Che (1996) assumes consumers are risk averse, and shows that a
monopoly also prefers to o⁄er a full refund rather than no refund if the consumers are
risk averse enough. These papers do not consider partial refunds, and so do not address
the excess refund puzzle. It seems clear that excessive refunds would be generated if
partial refunds were to be allowed in Che (1996), yielding an explanation based on risk
aversion. On the other hand, we conjecture that if partial refunds were allowed in Davis
4et al.(1995), optimal refunds would be too small rather than too large.9;10
Courty and Li (2000) present a screening model somewhat related to our Model SC.
It has a di⁄erent purpose, namely, to shed light on when menus of contracts are actually
used, such as an airline￿ s menu of business (refundable) and economy (less-refundable)
tickets. Unlike in our model, all consumers stay uninformed of their values prior to
purchasing. A consumer￿ s private type is the distribution from which her value will
be drawn after purchasing. The value distribution of a ￿high￿ type is greater than
that of a ￿low￿type either in the sense of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance, or in the
sense of being a mean-preserving spread. The main result is that the refunds high type
consumers obtain are equal to the seller￿ s salvage value (which is the production cost of
the good); the refunds the low types obtain may bear any relationship to the salvage
value. If the optimal menu ever contains just one contract, the refund it speci￿es is equal
to the salvage value. The model thus sheds little light on the excess refund puzzle.
Turning to Model IA, it can be viewed as a contribution to the literature on mech-
anisms that prevent, encourage, or determine information acquisition, such as Cremer
and Khalil (1992), Lewis and Sappington (1997), Cremer et al.(1998a,b), and Berge-
mann and V￿lim￿ki (2002). It also relates to studies of how much information a seller
should directly provide buyers about their personal values, such as Lewis and Sapping-
ton (1994), Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2002), and Eso and Szentes (2004).
More narrowly, Model IA can be viewed as an exploration of an early suggestion
made by Barzel (1982) that sellers may sometimes want to prevent buyers from acquiring
information. That suggestion is also formalized recently in Barzel et al.(2004) in a
model of IPO policies. An underwriter ￿stabilizes￿an IPO by promising to agree to
buy back a certain fraction of the shares from the buying investors at the IPO price.
This is analogous to a stochastic contract in our framework that randomizes between a
zero and a full refund. Barzel et al.(2004) show that if the underwriter wants to deter
buyers from acquiring information, its optimal stabilization policy pays the full refund
with positive probability.11
9This is because the consumers in Davis et al.(1995) bene￿t from the good during the trial period.
This should create a downward force on refunds, since large refunds aggravate the moral hazard of
consumers purchasing the good only to return it after use during the trial period.
10Marvel and Peck (1995) study refunds in a less related context. They show that a wholesaler might
o⁄er a retailer a refund for units of its good left unsold; this induces the retailer to stock enough of the
good when it faces uncertain demand.
11See Remark 3 in the Appendix of Barzel et.al.(2004).
5The retailing literature deals with return policies under the rubric of reverse logistics
(Rogers and Tibben-Lembke, 1998). None of it to our knowledge bears on the excess
refund puzzle. The study most related to Model SC seems to be Heiman et al.(2002),
which shows how menus consisting of a full-refund contract, a no-refund contract, and
an unbundled money back guarantee (essentially a pure insurance contract) can be used
to screen consumer types that have di⁄erent value distributions, roughly as in Courty
and Li (2000). Regarding Model IA, the most relevant paper seems to be Heiman
et al.(2001), which informally compares the relative merits of pre-purchase product
demonstrations to money back guarantees as ways to reduce consumer uncertainty.
Neither it nor any other study we have seen in the retailing literature considers the
possibility that ￿rms may not want consumers to acquire information.
1.2. Structure of the Paper
The environment is described in Section 2. Models SC and IA are studied in Sections
3 and 4, respectively; Model SC is studied ￿rst because it provides the building blocks
for Model IA. In both cases the e¢ cient, competitive, and monopoly contracts are
characterized. The analysis is applied to a monopoly wholesaler, rather than a monopoly
retailer, in Section 5. Concluding remarks are in Section 6. Appendices A and B contain
the proofs for Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Appendix C contains the calculations for
the examples.
2. Environment
A discrete returnable good is to be sold to a unit mass (continuum) of potential buyers.
We consider a competitive market, but devote attention to a monopolized market. We
refer to a seller as a ￿rm and the buyers as consumers, having in mind a retailer and
its customers. Under an alternative interpretation discussed in Section 5, the seller is a
wholesaler or manufacturer that sells its good to a competitive retail sector, and o⁄ers
refunds to the retailers for the goods that the consumers return to them.
2.1. Consumers
Each consumer wants at most one unit of the good. Her value for it, v; is drawn from
a distribution F that has a positive and di⁄erentiable density, f; on [0;1]; with mean
￿ v: An informed consumer knows her value for the good when she decides whether to
purchase it, and an uninformed consumer does not. No consumer￿ s value is observed
6by another party.
An uninformed consumer who purchases the good learns her value for it during an
initial trial period. The good gives her no bene￿t if she returns it at the end of the trial
period. The consumer bears a return cost of t ￿ 0 if she tries the good and then returns
it to the seller.
A consumer with value v who purchases the good for price p receives utility v ￿p if
she keeps it, gross of any cost she might have borne to become informed. If she instead
returns the good for a refund ^ r; her utility is ^ r ￿ t ￿ p:
We focus on two versions of the model that di⁄er in how the number of informed
consumers is determined.
Model SC (Screening). In this version an exogenously given fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of the
consumers are informed. In essence, these consumers have a negligible or even negative
cost of doing prior research to become informed. The remaining 1 ￿ ￿ consumers are
necessarily uninformed, and so can learn their values only by trying the good out.
Whether a consumer is informed is independent of her value.
Model IA (Information Acquisition). In this version all consumers are ex ante
identical and uninformed. Once she knows the set of contracts available in the market,
each consumer chooses whether to pay an information cost, c 2 (0;1); in order to become
informed (￿acquire information￿ ).
An encompassing model would allow the consumers to be arbitrarily heterogeneous
in their information costs. Consumers with very high or low information costs would
be like those of Model SC, and consumers with intermediate information costs would
be like those of Model IA. By restricting attention to Models SC and IA, we are able to
isolate the two forces at work, screening and information acquisition.
2.2. Firm
The ￿rm￿ s constant unit cost of procuring the good is k 2 [0;1): This is either the cost
of directly producing the good, or of obtaining it from a wholesaler.
The gross salvage value to the ￿rm of a returned good is denoted by ^ s. We assume
it is no greater than the cost of obtaining a new unit: ^ s ￿ k: This is obviously the case
when a returned good is simply discarded. It is also the case when a returned good is
resold, as then the salvage value is equal to the cost k that is saved when a returned
7rather than a new unit is used to make a sale, less the refurbishing, restocking, and
storing costs that are required to resell a returned good.12
We also assume ^ s ￿ t: the salvage value of the good is no less than the consumer￿ s
cost of trying and returning it. Most of the results would also hold if ^ s < t; but the
proofs would di⁄er slightly.
The (net) salvage value of the good is its salvage value less the consumer￿ s cost of
trying and returning it: s ￿ ^ s ￿ t. In terms of the net salvage value, the parameter
assumptions 0 ￿ t ￿ ^ s ￿ k become
Assumption 1. k ￿ s ￿ t ￿ 0 and s ￿ 0:
2.3. Contracts
The gross refund paid by the ￿rm for a return is ^ r. The (net) refund the consumer
receives is the gross bene￿t less the cost of trying and returning, r ￿ ^ r ￿ t: We assume
the gross refund cannot be negative, which is equivalent to r ￿ ￿t: A refund contract
is a pair (p;r) consisting of the purchase price p and the net refund r:
A ￿rm should never o⁄er a gross refund greater than the purchase price. Unlike
the possibly signi￿cant cost t of returning the good after trying it, a consumer￿ s cost
of returning the good immediately after purchasing it is presumably negligible. Hence,
o⁄ering a refund greater than the price would create a money pump in which consumers
would purchase and return large numbers of the good, creating a big loss for the ￿rm.
We accordingly require p ￿ ^ r; which is equivalent to p ￿ r + t:
We thus deem a contract (p;r) to be feasible if it satis￿es the following condition:
(FE) 0 ￿ r + t ￿ p:
A contract with a zero refund takes the form (p;￿t); since its gross refund is ^ r =
r+t = 0: Of course, any contract with a nonpositive net refund will generate no returns,
and hence be equivalent to a contract with a zero refund. We thus refer to any contract
(p;r) with r ￿ 0 as a no-refund contract.
A full (money-back) refund contract is one with ^ r = p, or rather, (p;r) = (p;p ￿ t):
12The alternative case, ^ s > k; is less plausible, though it might hold if ^ s is the price at which the ￿rm
can sell the good in a separate, distinct market.
82.4. Payo⁄s
An uninformed consumer returns the good if and only if she learns that her value is less
than the net refund o⁄ered for a return. Her induced value,
Vu(r) ￿
1 R
0
max(v;r)dF(v): (1)
is the most she would be willing to pay for the bundled good and refund option. Her
expected utility from purchasing according to the terms of a contract (p;r) is Vu(r)￿p:
The probability that an uninformed consumer returns the good is F(r): The expected
pro￿t of the ￿rm when an uninformed consumer chooses a contract (p;r) is thus
￿u(p;r) ￿ p ￿ k + (s ￿ r)F(r); (2)
Turning to the informed consumers, note that they do not care about the refund.
An informed consumer purchases the good only if she knows she will keep it, since the
refund is not more than the price. She purchases the good only if her value exceeds the
price. Her gross expected utility when o⁄ered price p is
Vi(p) ￿
1 R
p
(v ￿ p)dF(v): (3)
Her net expected utility is Vi(p)￿c if she paid c to learn her value. The ￿rm￿ s expected
pro￿t from o⁄ering the good for price p to an informed consumer is thus
￿i(p) ￿ (p ￿ k)(1 ￿ F(p)):
Assumption 2. ￿i(￿) has a unique maximizer, pI; and ￿0
i (p) ? 0 as p 7 pI:
3. Model SC
In this section we characterize in turn the e¢ cient, competitive, and monopoly contracts
in Model SC.
3.1. E¢ cient Contracts
E¢ cient Contracts for the Informed
It is e¢ cient to procure the good for an informed consumer if and only if her value for it
exceeds the procurement cost, i.e., v ￿ k: This outcome would be achieved if she were to
be o⁄ered any feasible contract of the form (p;r) = (k;r): The amount of the promised
refund is irrelevant, as an informed consumer who purchases the good never returns it.
9E¢ cient Contracts for the Uninformed
If an uninformed consumer obtains the good and learns her value is v; a surplus of s or
v is generated depending on whether she returns the good. E¢ ciency requires the good
to be returned if v < s. The resulting gross surplus is max(v;s): The expectation of this
is Vu(s), where Vu(￿) is de￿ned in (1). Hence, the maximal expected surplus generated
by giving an uninformed consumer the good is
S￿
u ￿ Vu(s) ￿ k: (4)
We assume it is e¢ cient to procure the good for an uninformed consumer:
Assumption 3. S￿
u > 0:
If an uninformed consumer purchases the good according to the terms of a contract
(p;r); the resulting outcome is e¢ cient if and only if r = s: The refund cannot be greater
or less than the salvage value, for then the consumer would ine¢ ciently return or keep
the good when her value is between r and s. In addition, the purchase price cannot be
too high: p ￿ Vu(s) is required in order for an uninformed consumer to purchase.
Among the e¢ cient contracts for an uninformed consumer that give both parties
nonnegative payo⁄s, (k;s) is the best for the consumer, as it gives the ￿rm zero pro￿t.
The best for the ￿rm is (Vu(s);s); which extracts the full surplus S￿
u:
Achieving E¢ ciency
In equilibrium, each consumer who purchases the good chooses her most preferred con-
tract in the market. The resulting outcome is e¢ cient if and only if the informed choose
a contract with price k; and the uninformed choose a contract with refund s:
The primary example of an e¢ cient contract is (k;s): If it is the only contract o⁄ered,
an e¢ cient outcome is achieved . Every informed consumer purchases the good if her
value is greater than k; and never returns it. Every uninformed consumer purchases the
good, and returns it if she learns v < s: The ￿rms make zero pro￿t.
E¢ ciency can also be achieved by a menu of contracts of the form f(k;r);(p;s)g;
provided the informed choose (k;r) and the uninformed choose (p;s): In general, many
such incentive compatible and individually rational menus exist. But in any case, e¢ -
ciency is achieved only if the uninformed choose a contract that speci￿es the refund to
be the salvage value. E¢ ciency precludes the paying of excessive refunds.
103.2. Competitive Contracts
As Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) proved, competition among ￿rms for consumers with
privately known types may yield an ine¢ cient outcome. Here, whether a consumer is
informed or uninformed is her privately known type. If competitive equilibria were to
be ine¢ cient, perhaps competition could generate excessive refunds. However, as we
now show, in our model competitive equilibria are e¢ cient.
Assuming the presence of multiple ￿rms, de￿ne a competitive menu of contracts to
be a set of refund contracts such that (a) each operating ￿rm o⁄ers one or more of
them; (b) each contract is chosen by a positive mass of consumers; (c) each ￿rm makes
nonnegative pro￿t; and (d) no ￿rm or entrant can o⁄er a new contract that would
attract consumers away from the menu and make positive pro￿t.
Observe that the e¢ cient singleton menu f(k;s)g is a competitive menu. The con-
tract (k;s) gives zero pro￿t to any ￿rm that o⁄ers it, whether it is chosen by an informed
or an uninformed consumer. Its e¢ ciency implies that no other contract can both at-
tract a consumer and yield positive pro￿t.
Other menus of contracts are also competitive, such as the outcome-equivalent menu
f(k;0);(k;s)g from which the informed choose either contract. But they all achieve a
zero-pro￿t e¢ cient outcome:
Proposition 1. Every competitive menu of contracts achieves an e¢ cient outcome,
and every contract in it earns zero pro￿t. In particular, (k;s) is in the menu and chosen
by all uninformed consumers.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix , and is fairly simple. At its heart is
the observation that (k;s) is a surplus-maximizing contract for either type of consumer.
It also generates the same pro￿t regardless of which type of consumer chooses it, as
does any contract with a refund equal to the salvage value. Hence, a putative ine¢ cient
equilibrium can always be destabilized by an entrant o⁄ering a contract that speci￿es
a refund equal to the salvage value, and a price slightly higher than k. Such a contract
is guaranteed to make a pro￿t, no matter which types it attracts ￿it is impervious to
the adverse selection that makes equilibria ine¢ cient in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
A standard undercutting argument then shows that all equilibria are e¢ cient.
Any refund paid for a return in a competitive equilibrium is thus equal to the salvage
value of the good. Competitive pressure does not account for excessive refunds.
113.3. Monopoly Contracts
Assume now there is only one ￿rm. We consider ￿rst its optimal menu of contracts that
induces the uninformed to purchase. Without loss of generality, we assume the menu
contains two contracts, one selected by each type of consumer. We can also assume the
contract meant for the informed is a no-refund contract; these consumers do not care
about refunds, and giving them no refund maximally weakens the incentive constraint of
the uninformed. Such a menu can be written as (pi;pu;r); where pi is the price speci￿ed
by the no-refund contract and (pu;r) is the refund contract.
The ￿rm￿ s optimal no-exclusion menu solves the following program:
(P) max
pi;pu;r￿￿i(pi) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿u(pu;r)
subject to
(IRu) Vu(r) ￿ pu ￿ 0;
(ICu) Vu(r) ￿ pu ￿ ￿ v ￿ pi;
(ICi) pu ￿ pi;
(FE) 0 ￿ r + t ￿ pu:
Constraint (IRu) is the individual rationality constraint insuring that the uninformed
purchase. The incentive constraint (ICu) requires an uninformed consumer to prefer
(pu;r) to the no-refund contract, which gives her utility Vu(0) ￿ pi = ￿ v ￿ pi: Incentive
constraint (ICi) requires an informed consumer to prefer the no-refund contract; she
does not care about the refund, and so prefers the contract with the lower price.
As the ￿rst step in solving (P), consider the relaxed problem obtained by remov-
ing both incentive constraints. Recall that pI maximizes ￿i(￿); and contract (Vu(s);s)
maximizes ￿u(pu;r) subject to (IRu): Hence, the solution to this relaxed problem, the
￿rst-best menu, is
MFB ￿ (pI;Vu(s);s):
When pI 2 [￿ v;Vu(s)]; the menu MFB satis￿es both incentive constraints: (ICu)
holds because 0 ￿ ￿ v ￿ pI; and (ICi) holds because Vu(s) ￿ pI: Furthermore, the ￿rm
cannot gain by excluding the uninformed in this case, as it would lose the pro￿t S￿
u from
each of them without being able to extract more from the informed. The menu MFB
is therefore the ￿rm￿ s optimal menu in this case.
When instead pI < ￿ v; the ￿rst-best menu violates the uninformed￿ s incentive con-
straint (ICu); since the no-refund contract with price pI gives the uninformed positive
utility. The constraint is optimally restored by making the no-refund contract less at-
tractive by raising pi above pI; and by making the refund contract more attractive by
12lowering pu below Vu(s): The refund remains equal to the salvage value. This is be-
cause raising the refund is an ine¢ cient way to give the uninformed rent. The ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t on an uninformed consumer is the surplus generated by the transaction less the
rent she must be given to satisfy her incentive constraint, and hence is maximized by
setting the refund equal to the salvage value to maximize the surplus, and lowering the
non-distortionary price pu to give the consumer the required rent.
We have thus obtained the ￿rm￿ s optimal scheme when pI ￿ Vu(s): The following
proposition, proved in the Appendix , summarizes.
Proposition 2. If pI ￿ Vu(s); the ￿rm does not exclude the uninformed, and its opti-
mal menu satis￿es r = s: This optimal menu is MFB if pI 2 [￿ v;Vu(s)]: If pI < ￿ v; then
pi 2 (pI; ￿ v] and pu = Vu(s) + pi ￿ ￿ v:
Excessive refunds are thus possible only when pI > Vu(s): In this case the ￿rst-best
menu violates the informed consumers￿incentive constraint, (ICi), since the price Vu(s)
in the refund contract is less than the pI of the no-refund contract. As we shall prove,
the constraint is optimally restored by making the no-refund contract more attractive
by lowering pi below pI; and by making the refund contract less attractive by raising
pu above Vu(s): But raising pu will cause the uninformed to refrain from purchasing ￿
unless the refund is raised as well. This generates an excessive refund.
However, lowering pi causes a loss in pro￿t on the informed that may outweigh the
pro￿t obtained from the uninformed. If so, the ￿rm should simply o⁄er the no-refund
contract with price pI that maximizes its pro￿t on the informed. The uninformed then
will not purchase, since pI > Vu(s) implies pI > ￿ v: The ￿rm does not prefer this no-
exclusion strategy if the informed consumers are only a small fraction of the population.
The following theorem gives the details.
Theorem 1. If pI > Vu(s); then ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1] exists such that the ￿rm does not exclude
the uninformed if ￿ < ￿ ￿. In this case the optimal menu satis￿es
pi = pu = Vu(r) < pI; and r ￿ s:
Furthermore, if s > 0 or ￿0
i(￿ v) > 1￿￿
￿ ; then r > s:
In addition to showing the optimality of excessive refunds, Theorem 1 also shows
that the ￿rm can achieve its optimal pro￿t by o⁄ering just one contract. Because the
two contracts in the optimal no-exclusion menu specify the same purchase price, the ￿rm
achieves the same outcome by o⁄ering just one contract, (Vu(r);r): This is in contrast
13to the case of Proposition 2, since then pi < pu except in exceptional cases. Thus,
within the context of Model SC, a ￿rm observed to sell a good for one price without a
refund and for a higher price with a promised refund, is not o⁄ering an excessive refund.
But a ￿rm observed to always sell its product with a refund may indeed be o⁄ering an
excessive refund.
We note in passing that each case in Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 holds for some
parameters. For example, if k > 0 and F is uniform, we have the case pI > Vu(s) of
Theorem 1.13
We end this section with an example showing that a ￿rm in Model SC may optimally
o⁄er a full money-back refund, as in reality many do.
Example 1. Let F be the uniform distribution, and let ￿ = :5; k = :45; s = :2; and
t = :245: As noted above, this case is that of Theorem 1. Calculations presented in
the Appendix show that an optimal strategy for the ￿rm is to o⁄er a single contract,
(p;r) = (:545;:3): This contract does not exclude the uninformed. It is a full refund
contract: the gross refund is ^ r = r + t = :545 = p:
4. Model IA
We now consider Model IA, studying in turn e¢ cient and monopoly contracts.
4.1. E¢ cient Contracts
For the same reasons as in Model SC, if it is e¢ cient for consumers to stay uninformed,
they must be given a contract of the form (p;s); with the price p low enough that they
purchase. If instead it is e¢ cient for them to become informed, they must be given a
contract specifying k as the purchase price. Determining whether they should become
informed requires a comparison of social bene￿ts and costs.
The social bene￿t of a consumer becoming informed is that the procurement cost of
the good can be saved when her value turns out to be less than k; as she should then
not be given the good. The social cost of her becoming informed is the information cost
c; and the expected opportunity cost of the unrealized net salvage value.
Formally, the expected surplus created if the consumers become informed is
S￿
i (c) ￿
1 R
k
(v ￿ k)dF(v) ￿ c = Vi(k) ￿ c: (5)
13If F(v) = v and k 2 (0;1), then pI =
k+1
2 >
s2+1
2 = Vu(s): If F(v) = v
2; each case can occur:
pI < ￿ v if k = s < :25; pI 2 [￿ v;Vu(s)] if :25 ￿ k = s ￿ :26649; and pI > Vu(s) if :26649 < k = s:
14On the other hand, the surplus created if they stay uninformed is S￿
u = Vu(s) ￿ k:
Whether they should become informed depends on which surplus is greater. Equating
the two and solving for c yields the social value of pre-purchase information:
c￿ ￿ Vi(k) ￿ S￿
u =
k R
s
F(v)dv: (6)
E¢ ciency requires the consumer to stay uninformed only if c ￿ c￿:
As in Model SC, e¢ ciency is achieved if (k;s) is the only contract available. To
prove this, we now need only to show that this contract induces e¢ cient information
acquisition. It does so because it gives a consumer all the surplus that can be generated
given her information choice: she obtains utility Vi(k) ￿ c = S￿
i (c) if she becomes
informed, and Vu(s)￿k = S￿
u if she does not. Each consumer thus acquires information
e¢ ciently if o⁄ered (k;s):
Other contracts also achieve e¢ ciency. If c ￿ c￿, any contract specifying a purchase
price of k and a refund less than the salvage value achieves an e¢ cient outcome, since
lowering the refund only increases the incentive to take the e¢ cient action of becoming
informed. If c > c￿; contracts generally exist that specify a greater price and achieve
e¢ ciency. The price cannot, however, be so high as to induce the consumers to become
informed or refrain from purchasing.
Despite this multiplicity, e¢ ciency requires that any refund ever paid be equal to
the salvage value, and hence precludes the paying of excessive refunds.
Furthermore, competitive refunds are also not excessive, because again a competitive
equilibrium is e¢ cient. In particular, if c > c￿ the competitive equilibrium consists of
all ￿rms o⁄ering (k;s): We omit a formal statement and proof of this, as the argument
is the standard one of Bertrand undercutting. Adverse selection is not an issue now,
since the consumers are ex ante identical.
4.2. Monopoly Contracts
We show now that a monopoly ￿rm o⁄ers an excessive refund if the consumers￿infor-
mation cost is not too low or high. The ￿rm raises the refund above the salvage value
so that it can charge a higher price without triggering information acquisition.
Consider ￿rst a consumer￿ s decision to acquire information. When o⁄ered a contract
(p;r), she becomes informed if Vi(p) ￿ c ￿ Vu(r) ￿ p: Using (1) and (3) and integrating
by parts, this becomes
c ￿
p R
r
F(v)dv: (7)
15The expression on the right of this inequality is the consumer￿ s value, when o⁄ered the
contract, for the pre-purchase information. She acquires the information only if her cost
of doing so is less than her value for it.
Now, recall the contract (Vu(s);s) that would yield pro￿t S￿
u if the consumers were
to stay uninformed. When o⁄ered it, a consumer￿ s value for information is
Vu(s) R
s
F(v)dv ￿ ￿ c: (8)
So the contract induces her to stay uninformed if her information cost exceeds ￿ c: Com-
paring (6) to (8), we see that ￿ c exceeds the e¢ cient critical cost c￿. Thus, when c ￿ ￿ c the
maximal surplus is greater when consumers stay uninformed: S￿
u > S￿
i (c): Furthermore,
the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t if it o⁄ers any contract that induces consumers to become informed is
at most the maximal total surplus S￿
i (c): The ￿rm is therefore best o⁄o⁄ering (Vu(s);s)
to obtain pro￿t S￿
u: This proves the following:
Lemma 1. If c ￿ ￿ c; the ￿rm￿ s unique optimal contract is (Vu(s);s); and the consumers
stay uninformed.
When the information cost is less than ￿ c; the ￿rm must take into account the possi-
bility that the contract it chooses to o⁄er may induce information acquisition. In order
to determine the ￿rm￿ s optimal o⁄er, we derive separately its optima within the sets of
contracts that do and do not induce the consumers to become informed.
Inducing Consumers to Stay Uninformed
A contract that induces consumers to stay uninformed fails to satisfy (7). Thus, if we
de￿ne a price P(r;c) by14
P(r;c) R
r
F(v)dv ￿ c; (9)
a consumer is content to stay uninformed if and only if the following information ac-
quisition constraint holds:
(IAu) p ￿ P(r;c):
It is easy to show that P(r;c) increases in both arguments. Hence, the greater is the
refund or the information cost, the more the purchase price can be raised without
14Let P(r;0) = 0 for r < 0; as any nonpositive price satis￿es (9) if r ￿ 0 and c = 0: Then P is
continuous on [￿t;1) ￿ R+:
16triggering information acquisition. The contract (Vu(s);s) that extracts the full surplus
from the uninformed fails to satisfy this constraint precisely when c < ￿ c:
The maximal pro￿t obtainable while inducing the consumers stay uninformed is
(Pu) ￿u(c) ￿ max
p;r p ￿ k ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r)
subject to (IAu);
(IRu) p ￿ Vu(r);
(FE) 0 ￿ r + t ￿ p:
The following proposition states that if the information cost is less than ￿ c; but the ￿rm
can still make pro￿t without inducing information acquisition,15 it does so optimally
by o⁄ering a contract for which the information acquisition constraint binds and the
refund is excessive.
Proposition 3. If c < ￿ c and ￿u(c) > 0; any solution (p￿;r￿) of (Pu) satis￿es p￿ =
P(r￿;c), and r￿ > s:
We explain the rationale for the excess refund result of Proposition 3 by comparing
its ￿low c￿case to the ￿high c￿case of Lemma 1. In the latter case, a consumer￿ s threat
of becoming informed is not credible. This allows the ￿rm, given any refund, to set
the purchase price equal to a consumer￿ s induced value for the good, Vu(r). The ￿rm￿ s
marginal bene￿t if it then raises the refund is the amount that doing so allows this price
to be raised:16
MBH ￿ V 0
u(r) = F(r):
On the other hand, in the low c case the information constraint binds, and so the ￿rm
sets the price equal to P(r;c) in order to deter information acquisition. The ￿rm￿ s
marginal bene￿t from raising the refund in this case is
MBL ￿ Pr(r;c) =
F(r)
F(P(r;c))
:
Note that MBL > MBH (as P(r;c) < 1) : the ￿rm￿ s marginal bene￿t from raising the
refund is strictly greater when it must deter information acquisition. The net cost of
providing the refund option is (r ￿ s)F(r) in both cases, and so raising the refund has
15A solution of (Pu) that yields nonpositive pro￿t is not relevant, since then the ￿rm optimally chooses
a contract that induces consumers to become informed. See Lemma B6 in the Appendix.
16The fact that V
0
u(r) = F(r) is intuitive. An increase of ￿r in the refund increases the consumer￿ s
induced value by the increase in the expected refund payment, F(r)￿r:
17the same marginal cost in both cases. The optimal refund in the low c case is therefore
greater than the optimal refund in the high c case. The latter refund is the salvage
value, by Lemma 1, and so the former refund must exceed the salvage value.
Inducing Consumers to Become Informed
We now turn to the ￿rm￿ s optimal contract that induces the consumers to become
informed. We can restrict attention to no-refund contracts, since the informed do not
return the good. The consumers then choose to become informed only if the purchase
price exceeds P(0;c): This yields another information acquisition constraint,
(IAi) p ￿ P(0;c):
Even if this is satis￿ed, the consumers will still stay uninformed if their payo⁄ from be-
coming informed, Vi(p)￿c; is negative. This yields the individual rationality constraint
(IRi) p ￿ Pi(c);
where Pi(￿) is the inverse of Vi(￿).
These two constraints are necessary and su¢ cient for the contract to induce the
consumers to become informed. The optimal price solves the program
(Pi) ￿i(c) ￿ max
p ￿i(p) subject to (IAi) and (IRi):
For small enough c; neither constraint binds and the optimal price is just pI: For higher
c; one of the constraints binds, and so determines the solution. Which one binds depends
on whether pI is greater than the mean value ￿ v; as the following proposition shows. The
two alternative cases are depicted together in Figure 1.
Proposition 4. Program (Pi) has a solution if and only if c 2 [0;Vi(￿ v)]: If pI ￿ ￿ v; the
solution is
p￿(c) =
(
pI if c ￿ Vi(pI)
Pi(c) if c ￿ Vi(pI):
(10)
If pI < ￿ v, the solution is
p￿(c) =
(
pI if c ￿
R pI
0 F(v)dv
P(0;c) if c ￿
R pI
0 F(v)dv:
(11)
18p
c
1
v
P(c,0)
pI
Pi(c), Vi(p)
Vi(pI) Vi( ) v
p*(c) if pI > v
p*(c) if pI < v
pI
Figure 1: The two possible forms of a solution to (Pi):
The Optimal Contract
The proof of the following theorem shows that a critical c exists such
￿i(c) ? ￿u(c) as c 7 c:
The ￿rm￿ s optimal strategy is thus to deter consumers from becoming informed precisely
when c exceeds c: The optimal refund is excessive in a range of cases because c is strictly
less than ￿ c : when c is between these two critical levels, the ￿rm induces consumers to
stay uninformed by o⁄ering a refund greater than the salvage value.
Theorem 2. Unique numbers 0 ￿ c ￿ c < ￿ c exist such that the ￿rm￿ s optimal contracts
and the consumers￿information acquisition decisions are the following:
1. if c < c; the ￿rm o⁄ers a no-refund contract with price pI; and the consumers
become informed;
2. if c 2 (c;c); the ￿rm o⁄ers a no-refund contract with price Pi(c); and the consumers
become informed;
3. if c 2 (c;￿ c); the ￿rm o⁄ers a refund contract with refund r > s and price P(r;c);
and the consumers stay uninformed; and
194. if c ￿ ￿ c; the ￿rm o⁄ers (p;r) = (Vu(s);s); and the consumers stay uninformed.
Furthermore, (a) c = 0 if and only if t = 0 and s = k; and (b) c = c if pI ￿ ￿ v:
We end this section with an example again showing that the ￿rm may optimally
o⁄er a full refund. This occurs when the transaction cost t is high enough that the
feasibility constraint in (Pu) binds, so that the gross refund is equal to the purchase
price. The example also shows that c may be more or less than c￿: This implies that
the ￿rm may induce too little or too much information acquisition. When c < c < c￿;
the ￿rm o⁄ers a refund that deters the consumers from becoming informed, whereas a
benevolent social planner would not; the opposite is true when c￿ < c < c:
Example 2. Let F be the uniform distribution, s = :125; and k = :375: Then Assump-
tions 1￿3 are satis￿ed for t ￿ :25: Given these parameters, in an e¢ cient outcome the
consumers become informed only if their information cost is no greater than c￿ = :0625:
The following claims are true. (a) If c = :1 and t 2 [:228;:25]; the consumers stay
uninformed and the ￿rm optimally o⁄ers a full refund. (b) If t = :23, then c > c￿:
(c) If t = 0; then c < c￿:
5. Monopoly Wholesaler
Rather than being a monopoly retailer, an alternative interpretation in either model is
that the ￿rm is a monopoly wholesaler or manufacturer that sells to a competitive retail
sector. The questions then center on the price and refund the wholesaler o⁄ers retailers.
The results of both models still hold, assuming the returns of a retailer to the wholesaler
are the goods returned to it by consumers.17 This is because the competition between
retailers drives their pro￿ts to zero, and they hence simply pass through to consumers
the price and refund set by the wholesaler. It is then as though the wholesaler deals
directly with the consumers.
To be speci￿c, let our ￿rm be a wholesaler that has cost k for producing a unit of
the good, and salvage value ^ s for each return. Its decision variables are a price p and
a gross refund ^ r to o⁄er retailers. Let tR be a retailer￿ s cost of returning the good to
the wholesaler, and let t continue to be the consumer￿ s cost of trying and returning a
good to a retailer. A retailer￿ s gross salvage value for a consumer return is then the
17The return to the wholesaler of unsold goods is beyond our scope here. Unsold goods do not arise
in this paper because of the absence of aggregate demand uncertainty.
20net refund it obtains from the wholesaler for the return: ^ sR = ^ r ￿ tR: A retailer￿ s net
salvage value for a return is thus
sR = ^ sR ￿ t = ^ r ￿ tR ￿ t:
A retailer￿ s cost of procuring the good is the price it pays the wholesaler: kR = p:
A retailer sells the good to consumers for a price pR and a gross refund ^ rR; which
amounts to what we have called a contract (pR;rR) with net refund rR = ^ rR ￿ t: A
competitive retail equilibrium in either model, as was discussed in the previous sections,
consists of each retailer o⁄ering the zero-pro￿t contract (pR;rR) = (kR;sR):18 Hence,
in terms of the wholesaler￿ s decision variables, the consumers face contract (pR;rR) =
(p;r); where r = ^ r ￿ tR ￿ t: Given the wholesaler￿ s choice of (p;r); the consumers have
exactly the same choice problem as in the previous sections. The wholesaler￿ s pro￿t
from an informed consumer is ￿i(p); as the retailers make zero pro￿t, an informed
consumer never returns the good, and she buys if and only her value exceeds pR = p:
Since every return to a retailer is returned to the wholesaler, the wholesaler￿ s probability
of a return from an uninformed consumer is the same as a retailer￿ s, F(r): Thus, letting
s = ^ s ￿ tR ￿ t; the wholesaler￿ s pro￿t on an uninformed consumer is
p ￿ k + (^ s ￿ ^ r)F(r) = p ￿ k + (s ￿ r)F(r) = ￿u(p;r):
These are the same pro￿t expressions as in the previous sections, and so their results
hold unchanged with the wholesaler as the ￿rm, except that now the cost of trying and
returning is the sum tR + t:
6. Conclusions
We have provided a possible explanation for the prevalence of generous return policies
for consumer goods. Rather than starting from the premise that consumers are risk
averse, our explanation is based on the premise that at least some consumers are able to
learn about their personal values for a good without trying it out. In either version of
the model, a seller with market power promises a refund that is no less, and is sometimes
more, than its salvage value for a return. Such refunds are excessive in so far as they
generate an ine¢ ciently high number of returns.
Refunds have a screening function in Model SC. The consumers in it are of two types,
those who are ex ante informed of their values, and those who are uninformed and can
18There may be other competitive retail equilibria, but as they are all e¢ cient and give retailers zero
pro￿t, the argument can be adapted to hold for them as well.
21learn their values for the good only by trying it out. By o⁄ering an excessive refund, the
￿rm is able to charge a higher price, and it chooses to do this if the price it would like
to charge the informed consumers in isolation is su¢ ciently high. An excessive refund
is promised in order to weaken the informed type￿ s incentive constraint. This screening
can occur without the use of a menu of contracts, since both types of consumer pay the
same price for the good when the incentive constraint of the informed types binds.
Refunds play a di⁄erent role in Model IA. Here, they serve to deter consumers from
becoming informed of their values before purchasing, thereby eliminating information
rents. The refund is not excessive if the consumers￿cost of acquiring information is so
high that it can be ignored. Otherwise the information acquisition constraint binds,
which causes any refund that is ever paid to be excessive. However, a caveat to this
excessive refund result is that for some parameter values, the ￿rm does not o⁄er a refund
when a benevolent social planner would (see Example 2).
Our explanations for excessive refunds also apply to the refunds a monopoly whole-
saler o⁄ers retailers for the returns that they receive from consumers. To the extent
that wholesalers are more likely than retailers to have market power, the model may be
at least as applicable to the excessive refunds o⁄ered by wholesalers to retailers as it is
for those o⁄ered by retailers to consumers.
The hypotheses developed here await empirical study. Future work will hopefully
produce the data and the empirical tests to determine the relative merits of the screening
and information acquisition (and risk aversion) rationales for refunds.
22Appendices
Appendices A and B contain the proofs omitted from Sections 3 and 4 for Models SC
and IA, respectively. Some lemmas in Appendix A are again used in Appendix B. The
calculations for each section￿ s example are collected in Appendix C.
A. Proofs for Section 3
Given a promised refund r; the surplus generated when an uninformed consumer pur-
chases, [Vu(r) ￿ p] + ￿u(p;r); is
Vu(r) + (s ￿ r)F(r) ￿ k = sF(r) +
1 R
r
vdF(v) ￿ k ￿ Su(r): (A1)
Lemma A1. The unique maximizer of Su(r) is s; yielding Su(s) = S￿
u: Furthermore,
S0
u(r) ? 0 as r 7 s:
Proof. Follows from S0
u(r) = (s ￿ r)f(r) and Su(s) = Vu(s) ￿ k = S￿
u: ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (~ p; ~ r) be a contract in a competitive menu chosen by some
informed consumers. These consumers are indi⁄erent between (~ p; ~ r) and the no-refund
contract (~ p;0): For any " > 0; they would prefer the contract (~ p ￿ ";0): An entrant
o⁄ering this contract would attract all the informed consumers and earn a pro￿t of
~ p￿"￿k on each of them, and on any uninformed consumers the contract might attract.
Since this entrant cannot earn positive pro￿t, we conclude that ~ p ￿ k: This implies that
every ￿rm makes nonpositive pro￿t on the informed consumers.
Now let (p;r) be a contract in the menu chosen by some uninformed consumers.
As the ￿rm o⁄ering it makes nonnegative pro￿t overall, and nonpositive pro￿t on the
informed, it must make nonnegative pro￿t on (p;r) when it is chosen by an uninformed
consumer: ￿u(p;r) ￿ 0: If r 6= s; the surplus generated when an uninformed consumer
chooses (p;r) is not the maximal amount, S￿
u = Su(s); by Lemma A1. Thus, an entrant
could o⁄er a contract of the form (p0;s), with p0 set so that Vu(s) ￿ p0 > Vu(r) ￿ p
and ￿u(p0;s) > ￿u(p;r): This new contract would attract all the uninformed, and earn
positive pro￿t on them. It would also earn positive pro￿t if an informed consumer chose
it, since its realized pro￿t does not depend on whether the good is returned. This is a
contradiction, since an entrant should not be able to make positive pro￿t. This proves
r = s: An undercutting argument like that above now proves p ￿ k: But since we have
already shown ￿u(p;r) ￿ 0 and r = s; we conclude that p = k:
23Every ￿rm thus makes zero pro￿t on the uninformed, and so must also make zero
pro￿t on the informed. Hence, ~ p = k: We conclude that every contract in the menu
makes zero pro￿t, and an e¢ cient outcome is achieved because the informed choose
contracts of the form (k; ~ r); and the uninformed choose (k;s): ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. We can assume pI < ￿ v; since the proof for case pI 2 [￿ v;Vu(s)]
is in the text. Consider the relaxed problem obtained from (P) by deleting constraints
(ICi) and (FE). This relaxed program has just two constraints, (ICu) and (IRu), and
they can be written as one, Vu(r) ￿ pu ￿ ￿ U(pi); where
￿ U(pi) ￿ max(0; ￿ v ￿ pi): (A2)
This combined constraint binds, as otherwise pu could be pro￿tably raised. Using this
binding combined constraint to substitute for pu in ￿u(pu;r); and using (A1), we can
write the relaxed program as
(Pa) max
pi;r
￿
￿￿i(pi) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ U(pi)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)Su(r): (A3)
A triple (pi;pu;r) solves the relaxed program obtained from (P) by deleting (ICi) and
(FE) if and only if (pi;r) solves (Pa) and pu = Vu(r) ￿ ￿ U(pi):
By Lemma A1, the second term in (A3) is uniquely maximized by r = s. Denote
the ￿rst term as A(pi); and note that
A0(pi) =
(
￿￿0
i(pi) + 1 ￿ ￿ for pi < ￿ v
￿￿0
i(pi) for pi > ￿ v:
Since pI < ￿ v; Assumption 2 and 0 < ￿ < 1 imply
A0(pi)
(
> 0 for pi ￿ pI
< 0 for pi > ￿ v:
All maximizers of A(￿) are thus in (pI; ￿ v]: Hence, ￿ U(pi) = ￿ v ￿ pi: We have thus shown
that any solution (pi;pu;r) of the relaxed program obtained by deleting (ICi) and (FE)
from (P) satis￿es r = s; pi 2 (pI; ￿ v]; and
pu = Vu(s) + pi ￿ ￿ v: (A4)
We now show that the relaxed program and (P) have the same solutions. We do
this by showing that any solution, say (pi;pu;r); of the relaxed program satis￿es the
neglected constraints (ICi) and (FE). Constraint (ICi) holds because (A4) and Vu(s) ￿ ￿ v
24imply pu ￿ pi: To establish (FE), note that pi > s + t, since pi > pI > k and, by
Assumption 1, k ￿ s + t: Hence, pu > s + t; and so (FE) holds.
This completes the proof, except for showing that the ￿rm cannot do better by
excluding the uninformed. Any contract that excludes them must have a price p ￿ ￿ v:
This price is greater than pI; since pI < ￿ v in the present case. Thus, lowering p to pI
increases the pro￿t obtained on the informed and, as a bonus, pro￿tably attracts the
uninformed too. Excluding the uninformed is therefore not optimal. ￿
Lemma A2. If t > 0; then rv 2 (s;1) exists such that Vu(rv) = rv + t and, for all
r ￿ ￿t;
Vu(r) ? r + t () r 7 rv:
If t = 0; we let rv = 1 and have Vu(r) > r for r < rv; and Vu(r) = r for r ￿ rv:
Proof. Note that V 0(r) = F(r) < 1 for all r < 1: By Assumptions 1 and 3, Vu(s) >
k ￿ s + t: Hence, Vu(r) > r + t for r ￿ s: For r ￿ 1; Vu(r) = r ￿ r + t: So
rv ￿ supfrjVu(r) > r + tg
is well-de￿ned and satis￿es the stated properties. ￿
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is in two steps. In the ￿rst we characterize the
optimal no-exclusion menu. In the second we show that this menu is better than the
no-refund contract with price pI that excludes the uninformed if ￿ is small.
Step 1. Consider the relaxed program obtained by deleting (ICu) from (P). In this pro-
gram (IRu) binds, as otherwise pu could be raised pro￿tably. So pu = Vu(r): Substitute
this into the relaxed program and use (A1) to obtain
(Pb) max
pi;r
￿￿i(pi) + (1 ￿ ￿)Su(r)
subject to
(IC0
i) pi ￿ Vu(r);
(FE0) 0 ￿ r + t ￿ Vu(r):
If (IC0
i) were not to bind in (Pb), its solution would be (pI;s); since pi uniquely max-
imizes ￿i(￿), s uniquely maximizes Su(￿); and (pI;s) satis￿es (FE0) by Assumptions 1
and 3. But then (IC0
i) would imply pI ￿ Vu(s); contrary to hypothesis. So (IC0
i) binds in
25(Pb), and its solution satis￿es pi = Vu(r): We can thus replace pi by Vu(r) and discard
(IC0
i): Finally, by Lemma A2, rv 2 (s;1] exists such that (FE0) is equivalent to
(FE
00) ￿ t ￿ r ￿ rv:
Hence, (pi;pu;r) solves (Pb) if and only if r solves the program
(Pb
0) max
r ￿￿i(Vu(r)) + (1 ￿ ￿)Su(r)
subject to (FE
00);
and pi = pu = Vu(r): Furthermore, pi = pu implies that the neglected constraint (ICu)
holds, since Vu(r) ￿ ￿ v for all r: This shows that (pi;pu;r) solves the original program
(P) if and only if r solves (Pb0), and pi = pu = Vu(r):
Denote the objective function of (Pb0) as M(r): It is a continuous function, with a
right derivative on [0;1) given by
M0(r) = ￿￿0
i(Vu(r))F(r) + (1 ￿ ￿)(s ￿ r)f(r): (A5)
For r < 0; M0(r) = 0: For r 2 [0;s); since Vu(￿) is nondecreasing and Vu(s) < pI here,
we have Vu(r) < pI: Assumption 2 thus implies ￿0
i(Vu(r)) > 0; and hence M0(r) > 0;
for r 2 [0;s): This shows that a solution of (Pb0) satis￿es r ￿ s: This inequality is strict
if s > 0; for then
M0(s) = ￿￿0
i(Vu(s))F(s) > 0:
If s = 0; then M0(s) = 0 and
M00(s) =
￿
￿￿0
i(￿ v) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
f(0);
using Vu(0) = ￿ v: So M00(s) > 0 if ￿0
i(￿ v) > 1￿￿
￿ , and this again yields r > s:
It remains to show that a solution (pi;pu;r) = (Vu(r);Vu(r);r) of (Pb) satis￿es
pu < pI: Assume the opposite. Then Vu(r) ￿ pI > Vu(s): This implies, since Vu(￿) is
nondecreasing, that r > s; and hence (s￿r)f(r) < 0: Also, Vu(r) ￿ pI and Assumption
2 imply ￿0
i(Vu(r)) ￿ 0: Thus, in light of (A5), M0(r) < 0: So r must be a left corner
solution of (Pb0): r = ￿t: This contradicts r > s; by Assumption 1. Hence, pu < pI:
Step 2. Write the optimal no-exclusion menu of Step 1 as a function of ￿;
(pi;pu;r) = (Vu(r￿);Vu(r￿);r￿);
where r￿ = r￿(￿) solves program (Pb0): Lemma A1 implies r￿(0) = s: Denote the value
function of (Pb0) as
￿sc(￿) ￿ ￿￿i(Vu(r￿(￿))) + (1 ￿ ￿)Su(r￿(￿)):
26By the maximum theorem, ￿sc(￿) is continuous on [0;1]: De￿ne
X(￿) ￿ ￿sc(￿) ￿ ￿￿i(pI):
The ￿rm does not exclude the uninformed when X(￿) > 0; since (pI;0) is the optimal
exclusion contract. Note that
X(0) = ￿sc(0) = Su(s) = S￿
u:
So Assumption 3 implies X(0) > 0: Thus, as X(￿) is continuous, ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1] exists such
that X(￿) > 0 for all ￿ 2 [0; ￿ ￿]: ￿
B. Proofs for Section 4
Recall that Proposition 3 is about
(Pu) ￿u(c) ￿ max
p;r
p ￿ k ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r)
subject to
(IAu) p ￿ P(r;c);
(IRu) p ￿ Vu(r);
(FE) 0 ￿ r + t ￿ p:
Lemma B1. ￿u(c) is well-de￿ned and continuous at any c ￿ 0:
Proof. For any c ￿ 0; the constraint set of (Pu) is non-empty, as it contains (p;r) =
(0;￿t): The constraint set is closed because its de￿ning functions are continuous. It is
bounded, since any feasible (p;r) satis￿es r 2 [￿t;rv]; by (FE), (IRu); and Lemma A2,
and p 2 [0;Vu(rv)] by (FE), (IRu); and the monotonicity of Vu(￿): So ￿u(￿) is well-de￿ned
on R+: As the constraint set is a continuous correspondence in c; ￿u(￿) is continuous
by the maximum theorem. ￿
The next two lemmas, as well as Lemma A2, establish properties of the constraint
set of (Pu); the shaded area in Figure 2. (The ￿gure is drawn for the case of a relatively
high c < ￿ c; so that the indicated crossing points satisfy rvp < rv: The opposite holds if c
is smaller.) Proposition 3 will be proved by showing that the solution of (Pu) is on the
indicated heavy line. Also shown are two iso-pro￿t curves; the higher one corresponds
to the case unconstrained by (IAu); ￿u(p;r) = ￿u(Vu(s);s) = S￿
u:
27p
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Figure 2: The constraint set of program (Pu):
Lemma B2. For any c 2 [0;￿ c); a unique rvp 2 (s;1] exists such that P(rvp;c) = Vu(rvp)
and, for all r 2 [￿t;1];
P(r;c) 7 Vu(r) () r 7 rvp:
Proof. First consider c 2 (0;￿ c): Since P(s;￿ c) = Vu(s); and P(s;￿) is increasing,
P(s;c) < Vu(s): But P(1;c) = 1 + c > 1 = Vu(1): By continuity, rvp 2 (s;1) ex-
ists such that P(rvp;c) = Vu(rvp): For any (^ r;^ c); we have the derivatives Pr(^ r;^ c) =
F(^ r)=F(P(^ r;^ c)) and V 0
u(^ r) = F(^ r); and hence Pr(^ r;^ c) ￿ V 0
u(^ r). Since rvp < 1;
P(rvp;c) = Vu(rvp) < 1: So Pr(rvp;c) > V 0
u(rvp): Therefore P(r;c) > Vu(r) if r > rvp;
and P(r;c) < Vu(r) if r < rvp:
Now consider c = 0: Since P(r;0) = max(r;0); and Vu(r) > r for r < 1; and
Vu(1) = 1; the lemma￿ s claim holds with rvp = 1. ￿
Lemma B3. For c ￿ t; P(r;c) ￿ r+t for all r ￿ ￿t: For c < t; there exists rp 2 [￿t;1)
such that P(rp;c) = rp + t and
P(r;c) ? r + t () r 7 rp:
Proof. Since F(￿) ￿ 1 and c ￿ 0;
P(r;c) ￿ r ￿
P(r;c) R
r
F(v)dv = c
28for any r: Thus, P(r;c) ￿ r + t for all r if c ￿ t: Now assume c < t: Then for r ￿ 1;
P(r;c) = r + c < r + t: Since P(￿t;c) ￿ 0; we have P(r;c) ￿ r + t at r = ￿t: Since
P(￿;￿) is continuous, this proves the existence of rp 2 [￿t;1) such that P(rp;c) = rp +t:
Because P(￿;c) is constant on [￿t;0]; Pr(r;c) < 1 for r < 0: For r ￿ 0; Pr(r;c) =
F(r)=F(P(r;c)):Thus, if r 2 [0;1) and P(r;c) = r + t; then Pr(r;c) < 1 (as t > 0 since
c < t): So the graph of P(￿;c) crosses that of r+t from above at rp; and the two curves
do not cross at any other r: ￿
Lemma B4. If c < ￿ c; any solution (p￿;r￿) of (Pu) satis￿es p￿ = P(r￿;c):
Proof. Assume p￿ < P(r￿;c): Then, as the only other upper bound on the price is
(IRu); it binds: p￿ = Vu(r￿): Hence, Vu(r￿) < P(r￿;c); and so Lemma B2 implies
r￿ > rvp > s: The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is
Vu(r￿) ￿ k ￿ (r￿ ￿ s)F(r￿) = Su(r￿):
Similarly, if the ￿rm were to instead choose (p;r) with p = Vu(r) and r 2 [rvp;r￿); its
pro￿t would be Su(r); which exceeds Su(r￿) by Lemma A1. This contradiction proves
p￿ = P(r￿;c): ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma B4, p￿ = P(r￿;c): It remains to show r￿ > s:
Lemma B4 also implies we can substitute P(r;c) for p in (Pu): That is, de￿ning
A(r) ￿ P(r;c) ￿ k ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r); (B1)
we have ￿u(c) = A(r￿); and r￿ solves the program
max
r
A(r) subject to ￿ t ￿ r ￿ min(rv;rvp;rp); (B2)
using Lemmas A2, B2, and B3. For r ￿ 0; A(r) = P(0;c) ￿ k: For r > 0;
A0(r) = Pr(r;c) ￿ F(r) + (s ￿ r)f(r)
=
￿
1
F(P(r;c))
￿ 1
￿
F(r) + (s ￿ r)f(r):
The ￿rst term on the right is positive for any r ￿ s; since then P(r;c) < P(s;￿ c) =
Vu(s) < 1: The second term is nonnegative for any r ￿ s: Hence, A0(r) > 0 for any r 2
[0;s]: The solution thus satis￿es r￿ > s or r￿ = min(rv;rvp;rp): Since min(rv;rvp) > s by
29Lemmas A2 and B2, we have r￿ > s or r￿ = rp: Thus, r￿ ￿ s would imply r￿ = rp ￿ s;
and so
￿u(c) = P(rp;c) ￿ k + (s ￿ rp)F(rp)
= rp + t ￿ k + (s ￿ rp)F(rp)
￿ rp + t ￿ k + (s ￿ rp)
= s + t ￿ k ￿ 0;
where the second equality comes from P(rp;c) = rp + t; and the last inequality from
Assumption 1. This contradiction of ￿u(c) > 0 proves r￿ > s: ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. The constraint set of (Pi) is
C ￿ fp 2 RjP(0;c) ￿ p ￿ Pi(c)g:
It is nonempty if and only if P(0;c) ￿ Pi(c): Note that Pi(￿) = V ￿1
i (￿) is decreasing,
with Pi(0) = 1 and Pi(Vi(￿ v)) = ￿ v: Also, P(0;￿) is increasing, with P(0;0) = 0 and,
by Lemma B7, P(0;Vi(￿ v)) = ￿ v: (This veri￿es the accuracy of the curves P(c;0) and
Pi(c) shown in Figure 1). Hence, C 6= ? if and only if c 2 [0;Vi(￿ v)]; program (Pi)
has a solution if and only if this is the case. Assumption 2 implies the solution is pI if
P(0;c) ￿ pI ￿ Pi(c); and that otherwise it is whichever price is closer to pI; P(0;c) or
Pi(c): The solution is thus the p￿(c) de￿ned by (10) and (11). ￿
Lemma B5. ￿u(0) = ￿i(0) if t = k ￿ s = 0: Otherwise, ￿u(0) < ￿i(0):
Proof. Suppose t = k ￿ s = 0: Then, when c = 0; a consumer can be induced to stay
uninformed if and only if the contract o⁄ers a full refund. That is: with t = 0; (FE)
is p ￿ r: Since P(r;0) = r for all r ￿ 0; (IAu) becomes p ￿ r: The two constraints
together are p = r. By Lemma A2, rv = 1; and so (IRu) amounts to r ￿ 1: Hence,
￿u(0) = max0￿p￿1 ￿u(p;p): Since ￿u(p;p) = ￿i(p) + (s ￿ k)F(p); we have
￿u(0) = max
0￿p￿1
f￿i(p) + (s ￿ k)F(p)g: (B3)
Thus, in this case ￿u(0) = max￿i(p) = ￿i(pI): By Proposition 4, ￿i(0) = ￿i(pI) too.
Hence, ￿u(0) = ￿i(0):
Now suppose t = 0 and k￿s > 0: Then, as (B3) relies only on t = 0; it still holds. Let
^ p maximize the expression shown on the right of (B3). Then ^ p 6= pI; as ￿0
i(pI) = 0 and
30s 6= k imply pI does not satisfy the ￿rst order condition. Hence, ￿i(^ p) < ￿i(pI) = ￿i(0):
Therefore, since s < k;
￿u(0) = ￿i(^ p) + (s ￿ k)F(^ p) ￿ ￿i(^ p) < ￿i(0):
Lastly, suppose t > 0: Then, if c = 0; no contract with a positive price induces
a consumer to stay uninformed; the only contract that does so is (0;￿t): (If t > 0;
then (FE), (IAu); and P(r;0) = max(r;0) together imply (p;r) = (0;￿t):) Hence,
￿u(0) = ￿u(0;￿t) = ￿k: Since ￿i(0) = ￿i(pI) > 0; this proves ￿i(0) > ￿u(0): ￿
Lemma B6. (i) ￿i(￿) is continuous and nonincreasing on [0;Vi(￿ v]: (ii) ￿u(￿) is con-
tinuous and increasing on [0;￿ c]; and ￿u(c) = S￿
u for c ￿ ￿ c: (iii) For all c ￿ 0;
max(￿u(c);￿i(c)) > 0:
Proof. (i) ￿i(￿) is continuous on its domain by the maximum theorem. It is nonin-
creasing because the constraint set of (Pi) shrinks as c increases, since P(0;c) increases
and Pi(c) decreases in c:
(ii) Lemma B1 shows ￿u(￿) is continuous, and Lemma 1 shows ￿u(c) = S￿
u for
c ￿ ￿ c: Let 0 ￿ c1 < c2 < ￿ c: Denote program (Pu) as (Pui) when c = ci: Let (pi;ri)
solve (Pui): Since P(r;c1) < P(r;c2) for all r; (p1;r1) is in the constraint set of (Pu2):
Hence, ￿u(c1) ￿ ￿u(c2): If this were an equality, (p1;r1) would solve both programs,
and so Lemma B4 would imply p1 = P(r1;ci) for both i = 1 and i = 2; contrary to
P(￿;c1) < P(￿;c2): Thus, ￿u(￿) increases on [0;￿ c]:
(iii) Consider a contract (p;s); with price p < Vu(s): The consumers will surely
accept it. If they stay uninformed, this contract yields pro￿t p ￿ k: If they become
informed, it yields the lower pro￿t ￿i(p) = (p ￿ k)(1 ￿ F(p)): Hence,
max(￿u(c);￿i(c)) ￿ max
p￿Vu(s)
￿i(p):
Thus, since k < 1 and Vu(s) > k imply maxp￿Vu(s) ￿i(p) > 0; max(￿u(c);￿i(c)) > 0: ￿
Lemma B7. P(0;Vi(￿ v)) = ￿ v:
Proof. This is a consequence of (9) and
￿ v R
0
F(v)dv = ￿ vF(￿ v) ￿
￿ v R
0
vdF(v)
= ￿ vF(￿ v) ￿
￿
￿ v ￿
1 R
￿ v
vdF(v)
￿
=
1 R
￿ v
(v ￿ ￿ v)dF(v) = Vi(￿ v): ￿
31Lemma B8. For any c 2 [0;Vi(￿ v)]; ￿u(c) > ￿i(c) if p￿(c) = P(0;c): In particular,
￿u(Vi(￿ v)) > ￿i(Vi(￿ v)):
Proof. This is implied by Lemma B6 if ￿i(c) ￿ 0: So assume ￿i(c) > 0: This, and
(p￿(c) ￿ k)(1 ￿ F(p￿(c))) = ￿i(c);
imply p￿(c) ￿ k > 0: This in turn yields p￿(c) > 0; and so 1 ￿ F(p￿(c)) < 1: Hence,
p￿(c) ￿ k > (p￿(c) ￿ k)(1 ￿ F(p￿(c))):
Since p￿(c) = P(0;c); the consumers are indi⁄erent about becoming informed when
faced with contract (p￿(c);0): So (p;r) = (p￿(c);0) is in the constraint set of (Pu):
Hence,
￿u(c) ￿ p￿(c) ￿ k:
The three displayed expressions imply ￿u(c) > ￿i(c): Lemma B7 now implies ￿u(Vi(￿ v)) >
￿i(Vi(￿ v)): ￿
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall the ￿ c de￿ned by (8), and note it is positive by Assumption
3. Part 4 of the theorem is proved in the text as Lemma 1. Here we prove the unique
existence of the indicated c and c, and parts 1 ￿ 3 of the theorem, separately for three
mutually exhaustive cases of the parameters. Part (a) of the theorem follows from the
combined analyses of the cases, and (b) is proved in Case 2.
Case 1: t = 0 and s = k:
By Lemmas B5 and B6, ￿u(0) = ￿i(0) and ￿u(c) > ￿i(c) for all c 2 (0;Vi(￿ v)]: The
optimal contract is thus a refund contract that induces consumers to stay uninformed,
for all c > 0: If c < ￿ c; the ￿rm o⁄ers a refund contract with refund r > s and price
P(r;c); by Proposition 3. This proves the theorem, with 0 = c = c: ￿
Case 2: t > 0 or s < k; and pI ￿ ￿ v:
Because t > 0 or s < k; Lemma B5 implies ￿u(0) < ￿i(0): By Lemma B8,
￿u(Vi(￿ v)) > ￿i(Vi(￿ v)): By Lemma B6, ￿u(￿) ￿ ￿i(￿) is continuous and increasing on
[0;Vi(￿ v)]: A unique 0 < c < Vi(￿ v) therefore exists such that
￿u(c) ￿ ￿i(c) S 0 as c S c: (B4)
The ￿rm thus o⁄ers a a refund contract if c > c; and this contract satis￿es the properties
stated in parts 3 and 4 of the theorem by Proposition 3 and Lemma 1. Because ￿u(￿ c) >
32￿i(￿ c), c < ￿ c: When c 2 [0;c); (B4) implies the ￿rm o⁄ers a no-refund contract that
induces the consumers to acquire information. The price in this no-refund contract is
the p￿
i(c) of Proposition 4, which is either pI or P(0;c) because pI ￿ ￿ v: But it cannot be
P(0;c); since then Lemma B8 would imply ￿u(c) > ￿i(c); contrary to c < c and (B4).
The ￿rm thus o⁄ers a no-refund contract with price pI for all c < c: This proves parts
1 and 2 of the theorem, with c ￿ c: ￿
Case 3: t > 0 or s < k; and pI > ￿ v:
The proof is the same as in the previous case, except that now, when c < c; Propo-
sition 4 implies that the price in the no-refund contract is pI for c ￿ Vi(pI); but Pi(c)
for c ￿ Vi(pI): This proves parts 1 and 2 of the theorem, with c ￿ min(c;Vi(pI)): ￿
C. Calculations for Examples 1 and 2
Calculations for Example 1. Here, F is uniform and ￿ = :5; k = :45; s = :2; and
t = :245: Hence,
pI = argmax
p
(p ￿ k)(1 ￿ p) =
1
2
(k + 1) = :725;
Vu (r) =
1 R
0
max(v;r)dv =
1
2
￿
1 + r2￿
:
So Vu(s) = 0:52: That Assumptions 1 ￿ 3 hold is immediate. As pI > Vu(s); we are in
the case of Theorem 1.
We ￿rst derive the optimal no-exclusion menu. Recall that we can take it to be a
single contract of the form (Vu(r￿);r￿); where r￿ maximizes
M(r) = ￿￿i(Vu(r)) + (1 ￿ ￿)[Vu(r) ￿ k + (s ￿ r)F(r)]
= :5
￿
:5
￿
1 + r2￿
￿ k
￿￿
1 ￿ :5
￿
1 + r2￿￿
+ :5
￿
:5
￿
1 + r2￿
￿ k + (s ￿ r)r
￿
subject to r 2 [￿t;rv]: (See Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 1 above.) The point rv is
determined by Vu(r) = r + t; which yields rv = :3: As shown in Step 1 of the proof of
Theorem 1, the solution r￿ is in the interval (s;rv] = (:2;:3]: On this interval,
M0(r) = :5
￿
1 + k ￿ (1 + r2)
￿
+ :5
￿
:5(1 + r2) ￿ k + s ￿ r
￿
= :5
￿
:7 ￿ r ￿ :5r2￿
> 0:
The solution is thus the upper corner: r￿ = rv = :3: The optimal no-exclusion contract
is accordingly (Vu(r￿);r￿) = (:545;:3); and it yields pro￿t M(:3) = :054113:
33The optimal contract that excludes the uninformed is the no-refund contract with
price pI = :725: It yields pro￿t
￿￿i(pI) = :5
￿
1 ￿ k
2
￿2
= :037813 < M(:3):
The ￿rm￿ s optimal strategy is thus to o⁄er the refund contract (:545;:3); rather than to
exclude the uninformed. ￿
Calculations for Example 2.
In this example F is uniform, and so the curves in Figure 2 are given by Vu(r) =
1
2
￿
1 + r2￿
and P (r;c) =
p
r2 + 2c for r ￿ 0: In all three parts, s = :125 and k = :375:
Assumptions 1 and 3 are then satis￿ed, and so is Assumption 1 if t 2 [0;k￿s] = [0;:25]:
Part (a). Fix c = :1: We ￿nd a range of costs t for which a full refund is optimal.
Recall from Proposition 3 that when c < ￿ c, a solution (p￿;r￿) to (Pu) generating
positive pro￿t satis￿es p￿ = P(r￿;c): Repeating (B2), the optimal r￿ solves the program
max
r A(r) subject to ￿ t ￿ r ￿ min(rv;rvp;rp); (C1)
where A(r) = P(r;c) ￿ k ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r): Here, for r ￿ 0 we have
A(r) =
p
r2 + :2 ￿ :375 ￿ (r ￿ :125)r:
This A(r) attains its global maximum at r = :39215; and increases on [0;:39215]: The
solution of (C1) is thus r￿ = min(rv;rvp;rp) if this is not greater than :39215:
The intersection points are determined by
1
2
￿
1 + r2￿
=
p
r2 + 2c =) rvp =
q
1 ￿ 2
p
2c = :32492;
r + t =
p
r2 + 2c =) rp =
2c ￿ t2
2t
=
:2 ￿ t2
2t
;
r + t =
1
2
￿
1 + r2￿
=) rv = 1 ￿
p
2t:
It is easily veri￿ed that rp = min(rv;rvp;rp) if t ￿ :22787; and so in this case the
solution of (B2) is r￿ = rp: This is a full refund contract because the gross refund is
rp + t = P(rp;c) = p￿:
For t ￿ :22787; the pro￿t from inducing the consumers to stay uninformed is
￿u(:1) = A(rp) =
s￿
:2 ￿ t2
2t
￿2
+ :2 ￿ :375 ￿
￿￿
:2 ￿ t2
2t
￿
￿ :125
￿￿
:2 ￿ t2
2t
￿
:
This must be compared to ￿i(c): Since
34pI = argmax
p
(p ￿ k)(1 ￿ p) =
1
2
(k + 1) = :6875;
and this exceeds ￿ v = :5; Proposition 4 implies ￿i(c) = ￿i(min(pI;Pi(c)); where
Pi(c) = V ￿1
i (c) = 1 ￿
p
2c:
Since Pi(:1) = :55279 < pI; ￿i(:1) = ￿i(:55279) = :079509: By a numerical calculation,
￿u(:1) > ￿i(:1) if t 2 [:22787;:25]: Thus, for each t in this interval the optimal contract
is the full refund contract (P(rp;c);rp): ￿
Part (b). Fix t = :23: From the above, if c = :1 then rp = min(rv;rvp;rp): As c de-
creases, rp decreases, rv does not change, and rvp increases. Hence, rp = min(rv;rvp;rp)
for any c < :1 Since the e¢ cient critical cost is
c￿ =
k R
s
F(v)dv =
1
2
￿
k2 ￿ s2￿
= :0625;
rp = min(rv;rvp;rp) when c = c￿: So, by the above arguments, the optimal pro￿t from
inducing the consumers to stay uninformed when c = c￿ is A(rp); where
rp =
2c￿ ￿ t2
2t
= :15674:
Hence,
￿u(c￿) = A(:15674) = :093911:
We now compare this to ￿i(c￿) = ￿i(min(pI;Pi(c￿)): Since Pi(c￿) = 1 ￿
p
2c￿ = :6464
and pI = :6875; we have
￿i(c￿) = ￿i(:64645) = :095971:
So ￿u(c￿) < ￿i(c￿): By continuity, ￿u(￿) < ￿i(￿) on an interval above c￿; and hence
c > c￿: ￿
Part (c). Now ￿x t = 0: This does not change the calculations c￿ = :0625 and
￿i(c￿) = :095971 made above for part (b). The intersection point rvp when c = c￿ is
rvp =
q
1 ￿ 2
p
2c￿ = :54120:
The other two constraints do not bind when t = 0 (as rv = 1 and rp = 1): Thus
￿u(c￿) is determined by ￿u(c￿) = maxr￿rvp A(r): Since the global maximizer of A(￿) is
r = :39215 < :54120;
￿u(c￿) = A(:39215) = :11503:
Thus, ￿u(c￿) > ￿i(c￿): So ￿u(￿) > ￿i(￿) on an interval below c￿; and hence c < c￿: ￿
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